What a self is. If ownership of the loss function requires a boundary, then identity becomes a question about interfaces rather than substances.
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What is the thing that owns a loss function?
Movement I ended by saying that prediction alone is not enough. A language model can predict. A beetle can predict. A person can predict. The difference is not simply the sophistication of the prediction, but whether there is a system whose own boundary is at stake when error arrives.
Movement II asks what that boundary is.
The answer is not skin, skull, body, or soul. A boundary is an interface: the maintained relation through which a system and its world affect one another while remaining distinct enough for one side to have a perspective.
Once that is clear, identity stops looking like a substance hidden inside the body. It becomes a question about a maintained boundary, a present moment, and a memory layer.
A self is not the inside of a body; it is a maintained boundary whose memory layer can be inherited by a next moment, and death is what happens when that layer becomes thermodynamically irrecoverable.
That sentence is the hinge of the arc.
It explains why a sleeping person can return, why a copy without a memory layer is only a twin, why a restored memory layer would be a claimant, and why “original” is less important than we usually think.
The movement does not claim that every boundary is conscious. It does not turn mortality into magic. It builds a narrower result: if there is no maintained boundary, there is no place for a perspective to belong.